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Abstract: Unbundling of the local loop (ULL) has seen quite different "success stories" in 
the various countries across Europe. Although the obligation for the provision of ULL was 
implemented in the regulatory framework early and mostly parallel to other means of 
liberalisation, national implementation has been rather heterogeneous. One question of 
decisive importance for national regulatory authorities (NRAs) was whether to foster 
service-based competition in the first phase of liberalisation or to focus on infrastructure-
based competition. The different NRAs chose to head down different roads. This paper 
analyses whether the strategy of NRAs has had any mid-term effect on the economic 
welfare created in the communications markets. It indicates that infrastructure-based 
competition has a positive effect on innovation. Moreover, infrastructure-based 
competition appears to be more important for business customers than for residential 
clients. On the other hand, service-based competition lowers call prices and appears to be 
more important to residential markets. The results of this study point out the importance of 
a balanced approach to both types of policies 
Key words: competition, telecommunication, ladder of infrastructure, ladder of 
investement, regulatory policies. 
  Introduction and types of competition  
The issue researched in this paper goes back to the fundamental 
questions discussed when markets for telecommunications services were 
opened up, namely what kind of competition delivers more favourable results 
– infrastructure or service-based competition? Today, this is still (or again) 
an intensively debated issue as far as policy changes, new business models 
(for example, virtual operators) and new – especially broadband – 
technologies are concerned. 
                     
(*) This paper was firstly prepared for and presented at the EURO CPR conference on March 
26-28, 2006 in Seville, Spain. 
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Regulatory policies in numerous countries have developed in very 
different ways. The issue of unbundling was raised in the United States in 
1996 (CRANDALL, 2005, p. 7). Prior to that point the competitive landscape 
had developed mainly through indirect access and resale in voice telephony 
markets (VOGELSANG, 2005, 2002). European countries followed a joint 
approach to market opening. Some of the countries started before the joint 
policy took effect, notably with indirect access for international calls (for 
example,. Sweden in 1993).The UK was an exception with its duopoly 
policy, which was implemented as early as the 1980's. When the 1998 
framework was implemented in the member states 1 many countries saw the 
emergence of operators offering voice communication based on 
interconnection. Many incumbents criticized this approach as arbitraging 2.  
Whereas interconnection was a fundamental part of the joint framework, 
access competition through unbundling local loops was compulsory only 
after its introduction by EU legislation at the end of the year 2000 3. With 
that step, further business models have arisen based on line sharing, 
bitstream access and most recently "naked DSL", for example 4. The move 
towards all-IP networks and the ability to interconnect/get access to such 
NGNs extends the debate to net neutrality (See NICHOLLS, 2006; VON 
SCHEWICK, forthcoming 2007).  
These different types of business models have re-launched the debate as 
to what sort of competition is sustainable. This debate also has to be seen in 
the light of the contents of the European framework, according to which 
national regulatory authorities should encourage efficient investment in 
                     
1 See the implementation reports from the EU commission with respect to the development of 
competition: 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/implementation/ index_en.htm 
2 However, for these business models, the issue of efficient infrastructure investment can also 
be discussed in relation to the different levels of the network hierarchy where interconnection 
takes place and the extension of investment in double, single and local interconnection over 
time as a stepwise extension of alternative networks, see Piepenbrock/Schuster (Eds.): Anreize 
für Infrastrukturinvestitionen bei der Zusammenschaltung in der Telekommunikation, 2003. 
3 Regulation No. 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Unbundled 
Access to the Local Loop: http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/regullfin-en.pdf. 
Compared to directives, which have to be transposed into national law, regulations are directly 
"enforceable". 
4 CAVE, 2004. It seems that some countries are following the approach of the ladder of 
investment; see ERG (05)23, 2005, Annex A "Country Studies": 
http://erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_05_23_broadbd_mrkt_comp_annex_a_p.pdf 
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infrastructure and promote innovation 5. The discussion is now centring on 
terms like "ladder of investment", "emerging markets" and "access holidays".  
Today's regulatory framework already offers several ways of fostering 
competition and regulators have chosen different strategies in the past to 
open up the communications markets. Companies have also chosen 
different strategies to enter the markets, based on the economic principles 
laid down in regulatory decisions. These various regulatory means 
("toolbox") for opening markets and networks have become intensively 
debated issues between former monopolists, regulatory bodies and 
competitors. The main point has been whether infrastructure or service-
based competition would lead to lower prices, more differentiated and 
innovative products and improved services for consumers. The cost of 
regulation is an additional point (ELLIG, 2005).  
A frequently discussed concept is the ladder of infrastructure competition, 
which argues that new entrants may enter the market based on a wholesale 
product where they only cover minor elements of the value chain (such as 
resale) and then – once the customer base grows and financial means 
become available – move on to "higher rungs" of the ladder. This implies 
that operators supply more elements of the value chain themselves by 
building their own infrastructure and acquiring only the residual infrastructure 
from the incumbent's wholesale department. This includes a move for the 
operators from service to infrastructure-based competition. Hence, by 
implementing this ladder, both infrastructure and service based competition 
is promoted (VOGELSANG, 2005, p. 58).  
  Empirical analysis 
In order to answer the question, whether infrastructure or service-based 
competition should be promoted by NRAs, we first examined which countries 
followed which type of policy. This paper focuses on the EU-15 countries 
(the countries belonging to EU before May 1st, 2004) since these EU 
members all had a similar regulatory framework. The categorization between 
service and infrastructure-based competition (specifically in light of the issue 
                     
5 See, for example, Art. 8 para. 2 of the Framework Directive: Directive 2002/21/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the council of March 7th 2002 on a common regulatory framework 
for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), Official Gazette, 
no. L 108/33 of April 24th 2002. 
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of ULL) in this paper is based on the principle that, from an economics point 
of view, the replication of the local loop does not make sense 6 and 
therefore only the use of the last mile is a relevant differentiating factor 
between service and infrastructure-based competition. If an operator needs 
more elements of the access network than only unbundled local loops, as is 
the case, for example, with bitstream access or simple resale, we consider 
this kind of competition as service-based competition 7.  
The selection of the EU-15 implies that the toolbox at hand for the 
regulators has been largely the same and that NRAs have had the 
opportunity to focus on infrastructure-based competition (mainly ULL) or 
service-based competition (resale, indirect access 8, etc.).  
We divided the countries into two different clusters based on statistics 
regarding the success of the different regulated products and the date of 
introduction for these products, as well as the ECTA Broadband Scorecard. 
• Group 1: infrastructure-based competition has been the main 
objective of the NRA visible in its policy and decisions. 
• Group 2: the NRA has focused on service-based competition to a 
greater extent. 
For clustering, this papers looks at main indicators describing the 
performance of competition in order to identify the type of policy NRAs have 
pursued 9. This method is based on the assumption that NRAs are following 
definedregulatory goals and policies by using the toolbox to foster the two 
                     
6 CAVE, 2004, p. 8. This assumption may be debated in light of the NGN discussion (see VON 
SCHEWICK) and the development of competition in the USA in recent years after major parts of 
the unbundling regime was abolished, see CRANDALL. 
7 In our opinion the fact of complete ownership alone does not constitute a relevant means of 
differentiation. The demarcation point between service-based and infrastructure-based 
competition is often contested. The Danish regulator, for instance, considers only the full 
replication of the whole infrastructure including the last mile as infrastructure-based competition 
and all forms of network access as service-based competition; see: HENTEN & SKOUBY, 
2005, p. 2. The triennial review in the USA also changed the picture of regulation and the 
assessment of the contribution of service versus Infrastructure-based competition. 
8 We are aware that this classification can be critical for those companies who invest in certain, 
but not in all parts of the infrastructure. Whereas a pure reseller can be easily allocated to 
service-based competitors, this is more difficult with indirect access operators and backbone 
providers, for example. Furthermore, we are aware that regulators might view their policy 
classification in a different way. We have consequently defined clear cut criteria whereby policy 
can be evaluated. 
9 Due to size limitations, the full results of the empirical study cannot be displayed here, but a 
longer version of the paper with all details can be downloaded from: http://www.psc-ag.biz. 
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different policy types either implicitly or explicitly 10. For the empirical study, 
it is further assumed that the intentions of the NRA have had a direct impact 
on market development, i.e. NRAs are successful in the implementation of 
their policies and that this is impacting market development. Using these 
indicators, countries are clustered according to whether they have focused 
on infrastructure or service-based competition.  
The first indicator assesses how successful infrastructure based 
competition has been by describing the competitors' markets shares 11 with 
respect to access line competition and the proportion of service-based 
competition (resale and bitstream access) of all wholesale products 12.  
The second indicator uses the competitors' market shares of local loops 
(both, line sharing and fully unbundled loops) and the market shares of all 
competitors in broadband markets (measuring the success of competitors).  
The third indicator measures the success of competitors in broadband 
markets in relation to their share of the retail market. By looking at the 
proportion of infrastructure-based competition and thereby excluding CATV, 
the same analysis can be conducted for the DSL-market only, which gives 
us the fourth indicator. 
A second way to quantitatively measure regulatory policy is by examining 
the date at which different wholesale products were introduced. Our 
research looked at the regulatory situation at the beginning of the 
millennium, as it takes some time from the introduction of the wholesale 
products until an outcome can be measured as far as competition in the 
retail markets is concerned. We used the dates of introduction of ULL and 
carrier (pre)selection services as the fifth indicator. Annex I contains the 
result of this clustering. 
                     
10 For example, because the national Telecom Act contains a preference for a specific type of 
policy. 
11 We do not consider any other factors that could affect broadband penetration. For further 
information see FLAMM, 2005. 
12 ECTA Broadband Scorecard Q2/2005 (downloadable under www.ectaportal.com) and 
calculations of Piepenbrock Schuster Consulting AG. 
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  The effects of regulatory policy on the competition 
situation 
Price and penetration as measurements of competition and innovation 
The study aims to determine which regulatory policy has had the greatest 
impact on competition with respect to measurable effects with regard to 
service or infrastructure-based competition. The clustering of countries is 
based on the analysis in the previous chapter. This chapter examines the 
output of regulatory policies (with the help of the clusters). 
Regulation is put in place in order to generate positive welfare effects 
where marketsa alone would not tend to perfect competition. The problem is 
how to measure these welfare effects, as they can occur as consumer 
surplus, producer surplus, societal gains (i.e. increased tax income, better 
working conditions, etc.). The main aim of liberalisation in the EU was to 
increase overall welfare through lower prices, enhanced consumer choice, 
innovative products, etc. 13. Therefore, we examined the welfare effects 
measured by the state of competition, which is defined through the price 
situation. This is based on the assumption that more competition reduces 
prices in the market.   
Competition can also increase consumer welfare without reducing prices. 
This is achieved by innovation. Therefore, we also examine if there are 
differences in terms of innovation in countries according to regulatory policy. 
A typical assumption is that the innovation and penetration rates of new 
services and technologies correlate (see, for example, McNARY, 2001; ERG 
(03), 2005). Therefore, we measured innovation by the penetration rates of 
broadband uptake, as well as the uptake of ISDN 14. The statistical method 
chosen is the t-test 15. As the variance of the two clusters have different 
values for the variances, we carried out the heteroscedastic t-test.  
                     
13 Commission Staff Working Document, "Europe's Liberalised Telecommunications Market - A 
Guide to the Rules of the Game", from October 18th 2000. 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/info-soc/telecompolicy/en/userguide-en.pdf 
14 See, for example, VON SCHEWICK with respect to different forms of innovation and their 
assessment with regard to the discussion on network neutrality. 
15 Confer to http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stathome.html, "The t-test is the most commonly 
used method to evaluate the differences in means between two groups. For example, the t-test 
can be used to test for a difference in test scores between a group of patients who were given a 
drug and a control group who received a placebo. Theoretically, the t-test can be used even if 
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Effects on competition and innovation 
Based on the indicators for penetration rates, price competition, price 
development from 2000-2004, as well as prices corrected with PPP 
(purchasing power parity), the outcomes on competition and innovation were 
calculated. The results are shown in the table in annex II. The test also 
includes prices adjusted for PPP. These results are more or less the same in 
terms of the prices before the adjustment, so the adjustment does not make 
any difference.  
By comparing the computed mean values of the two groups, we conclude 
that prices are lower and penetration rates are higher in those countries with 
predominantly infrastructure-based competition. By using the t-test, we 
derive that the results are significant in most cases 16.  
Result 1: countries with predominantly infrastructure-based competition 
have lower overall prices and higher penetration rates and thereby 
more innovation. 
Furthermore, there are higher penetration rates on average in countries 
with infrastructure-based regulatory policies, although these results are only 
significant for broadband markets, but not for ISDN. There is a risk of auto-
correlation in this case, since the countries were clustered partially by the 
penetration rates, but as other factors were considered as well, this risk has 
been reduced.  
Result 2: analysis of penetration rates tends to indicate that 
infrastructure-based policies foster higher penetration rates. With 
regard to price levels in 2004, these are lower in countries with 
infrastructure-based policies. The results, however, are not significant 
for the residential baskets. The differences between the clusters are 
especially high for business customers.  
Result 3: there is an indication that infrastructure-based competition is 
of greater importance to business customers than to residential 
customers. 
                     
the sample sizes are very small (as small as 10 for example; some researchers claim that even 
smaller n's are possible), as long as the variables are normally distributed within each group 
and the variation of scores in the two groups is not reliably different." 
16 There is one critical remark to be made though, and that is because of the relatively large 
variances. The reason for these variances is the small sample of countries included in the 
study. It is therefore advisable for the results in this study to be validated in future research 
using additional methods to those applied here. However, the results by comparing the means 
and the variances by using the t-test are nevertheless strong and, in several cases, achieve a 
confidence interval of 95%, so that the results in this study are to be seen as significant. 
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When looking at the prices in 2005, however, according to the 11th 
implementation report of the EU Commission, the results are – with one 
exception – no longer significant. When considering monthly rental charges 
for business customers alone, it is significant that prices are much lower in 
countries with infrastructure-based competition. As for OECD baskets and 
monthly rental for residential customers, prices are still higher in countries 
with service-based competition, but the results are no longer significant.  
The changes which took place between 2004 and 2005 are elements of a 
long term process. Hence, a trend towards price harmonisation did emerge 
between the two clusters during the period 2000 to 2004 – although these 
results are not significant according to the t-test for the monthly rentals and 
for the national business and residential basket.  
Result 4: price differences between countries with mainly service-
based and infrastructure-based competition.are diminishing throughout 
Europe. 
In the period 2000 to 2004, the monthly rental went up by almost 30% on 
average in countries with service-based competition, while prices in 
countries with regulation focusing on infrastructure-based competition 
increased by only 3.9% (business customer) and 8.8% (residential 
customers). The increase in monthly rental prices was over-compensated by 
far in those countries with service-based competition. In fact, the prices for 
OECD baskets (which also include monthly rental) decreased by 12-16% 
over the same period in countries with service-based competition. In those 
countries with more infrastructure-based competition, OECD baskets 
decreased only slightly. This indicates that service-based competition is 
more important for residential clients, while infrastructure-based competition 
is more important for business customers.  
Result 5: there are clear indications that tariff rebalancing has gone 
further in the countries with service-based competition than in those 
with infrastructure-based competition. 
Critical remarks 
Some comments regarding the methods used in this study are called for.  
In order to carry out the study, binominal clustering of the countries was 
effected. There are naturally measurable differences within the two clusters 
in some cases and conducting statistical tests with a binominal independent 
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variable is not optimal. The alternative would have been to rank the 
countries. Since it is very difficult to measure "better or worse" strategies, the 
significance of the results would not have been higher, since the clustering 
would only have been more arbitrary. 
Another problem derives from the role of CATV, which has existed all of 
the time and has had a positive impact on competition, but has hardly been 
influenced or promoted by regulation. Therefore, assessing the impact of this 
alternative infrastructure with intermodal competition correctly is difficult. The 
same holds true for countries that have opened up markets at different dates 
and with other policies than those within the harmonized EU framework such 
as the UK. Policy changes, as well as different liberalisation starting points, 
can nevertheless influence the significance of the results, as, for example, 
the outcome of regulation in earlier years in the UK might still have an 
impact on communication markets. 
Moreover, the sample sizes are rather small and the variances are in 
several cases are large, which is a problem in terms of the significance of 
the results. The results in this study consequently need to be considered 
with care and it is advisable to verify the results in future research by other 
methods or larger samples. 
  Analysis and discussion  
Following on from the results, this section addresses issues in direct 
relation to the topic, especially in current regulatory discussions. The main 
findings are summarized in boxes within the text. 
Types of competition 
The empirical study has shown that infrastructure-based competition has 
led to significantly lower access costs and call tariffs for business customers 
and, to a slightly lesser extent, for residential customers in its early stages. 
However, call tariffs, as well as access costs for fixed line services (monthly 
line rental) have risen after a decrease for both customer groups slightly 
again over time in countries with infrastructure-based competition. 
On the other hand, where service-based competition is fostered, 
infrastructure-based operators try to compensate for the loss in variable 
76   No. 64, 4th Q. 2006 
turnover from call prices by sharply increasing line rental prices. This is done 
either by tariff rebalancing and/or by including call prices in the price of the 
rental ("bundling", "optional tariffs"). Sharply reduced tariffs for call prices 
mostly overcompensated for the line rental increases. Compared to 
infrastructure-based countries, call prices saw an overall steeper decline in 
service-based countries. 
An interesting aspect can be observed in recent periods. Overall price 
structures in service-based and infrastructure-based countries tend to 
conform to each other and the differences begin to diminish. From our point 
of view, this can be traced back to the fact that most countries started with 
fragments of the ladder of investment and with the introduction of additional 
rungs, while market players have invested in further rungs. The benefits of 
both strategies are now beginning to evolve and compensate for the 
negative aspects of the other – reduced access costs from infrastructure-
based competition are starting to be linked to  low call tariffs from service-
based competition. The task facing NRAs is to render all rungs of the ladder 
of investment operational in order to increase customer welfare.  
Conclusion: with a stepwise introduction of the ladder of investment 
NRAs can focus on a specific liberalisation strategy. But only complete 
implementation of the ladder of investment will bring full customer 
welfare. 
Infrastructure-based competition has led to lower prices. Competitors will 
undertake investment in their own infrastructure, only if the return justifies 
that investment. Therefore, business customers with a high impact on return 
on investment are those entities that benefited most from infrastructure-
based competition. Residential customers often benefit from the investment 
made for business customers as the incremental costs for introducing 
residential offers are low once business offers exist. Furthermore, residential 
customers contribute to economies of scale and scope, and justify the 
additional investment in the residential market. This reduces both costs and, 
indirectly, the prices of the services. On the other hand, ULL-operators have 
incentives to raise prices once competition is reduced. Only a limited number 
of ULL-operators is able to survive in a market place, as sunk costs and 
necessary economies of scale reduce the ability and willingness of other 
players to enter the market. The market could consequently end up in a 
situation of oligopoly. In such a situation of imperfect and restricted 
competition, ULL operators have strong incentives to collude and raise 
prices as the lockin effects for consumers are significant.  
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In this situation, service-based competition could help to keep prices low 
if introduced as a complement to infrastructure-based competition. Products 
like indirect access and resale limit the flexibility of the ULL-operator to raise 
prices and are an efficient means of fostering competition with respect to 
end user prices 17.  
Conclusion: the complementary introduction of service and 
infrastructure-based competition limits the negative outcomes of either 
and supports the development of the positive elements of both 
liberalisation strategies. 
Although, intramodal competition is not reflected in this study, one has to 
bear in mind the effects of such competition. Especially the different cost 
structures and the different technologies involved create some room in which 
competition can develop. NRAs need to be aware of the regulatory 
interdependence created by intermodal and intramodal competition. If one 
side of competition, i.e. one type of market player, is regulated, but the other 
side is not, the question arises whether this leads to a distortion of 
competition (such as the non-regulation of CATV-networks) 18. 
Conclusion: technology neutral regulation is a means of limiting the 
risks of distortions of intermodal and intramodal competition. 
Management decisions and their influence on investment in 
infrastructure 
As far as the influence of the NRA's decisions on how to open up the 
market to competition are concerned, the influence of operators must not be 
overlooked, as it is them who decide on the investments made. The 
following list contains key factors that influence management decisions. 
Time to market  
The liberalisation period was rather short, making time to market a key 
factor. In countries like the UK, France or Germany it was evident that once 
                     
17 On the issue of complementary products and foreclosure in the NGN world (with respect to 
competition in the service and application layers) see VON SCHEWICK (forthcoming, 2007). 
18 A similar question was raised in a decision by the Dutch Competition Court, which annulled 
an NRA decision on mobile termination market analysis and remedies, thereby stating that 
regulation of the fixed market had led to the loss of any counterveiliing buying power against the 
mobile networks. 
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a clear decision was taken by the NRA on a specific access product, market 
players could focus on that product immediately (if the product seemed 
capable of forming the basis of a sound business plan). From this, we can 
derive the importance of the decision made by NRAs regarding access 
products for the market. 
Product differentiation  
During the liberalization process, the first goal of a company was to gain 
market share. The easiest way of achieving this was to duplicate the 
incumbent's products and offer similar products at a reduced price. 
Therefore, it is sometimes proposed to set lower prices for products at lower 
rungs of the ladder of investment. This would raise competitor's profits and 
give them the possibility to gather a customer base and to invest in 
infrastructure. NRAs then raise prices for low rung products of the ladder 
over time to incentivise investments in access products of higher rungs and 
to "force" competitors to invest in infrastructure. Yet one has to bear in mind 
that this proposal may distort competition for late entrants. Climbing the 
ladder of investment should be a possibility at all times as competition may 
not necessarily be carried out via pricing, but also via product differentiation.  
Innovation  
In telecommunications, mainly new technologies enable innovative 
services. Infrastructure-based companies form the basis of such innovations 
as they have control over the development and use of the infrastructure. The 
"enabler" of such new technologies can therefore either be new entrants or 
existing operators who place additional investments. One has to bear in 
mind that wholesale, especially access, obligations are not a priori 
preventing investment if access conditions are set at a competitive level and 
prices enable sufficient returns on investment. Therefore, wholesale 
obligations may even foster competition, penetration rates and the 
introduction of innovative services and technologies. This should be the case 
when the access obligations and thus the returns on investment of the 
wholesale business are neutral (economically) compared to the retail 
business.  
Conclusion: market liberalisation follows the clear path of a product life 
cycle in competitive markets. Regulation paves the way for investors to 
enter markets and the products they intend to introduce.  
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Pricing 
To be able to make the ladder of investment operational it is necessary 
that prices in wholesale markets for the different products are consistent but 
also that there are clear rules for migration from one product to another 
(ERG (05)23, 2005, exec. summary).  
"The imposition by national regulatory authorities of mandated access 
that increases competition in the short-term should not reduce 
incentives for competitors to invest in alternative facilities that will 
secure more competition in the long-term." (Recital 19 of Access 
Directive).  
This means that NRAs need a long term view of their decisions. 
Disruptive changes in prices of products or conditions belonging to the 
ladder of infrastructure would automatically lead to a distortion of competition 
and discrimination either against first movers or late entrants. Higher prices 
over time would incentivise a stop of investment of new entrants and lead to 
a "closed user group" of first-mover-entrants with initially lower costs of entry 
(ELLIG, 2005). 
We have seen (especially in France, the UK and Germany) that 
companies tend to invest in those access products that are available under 
defined conditions to be able to enter the market as quickly as possible and 
under a secure framework of conditions established by the NRA 
(BERGMAN, 2004). If NRAs want to incentivise the market to move towards 
infrastructure-based competition, a consistent pricing structure with regard to 
the ladder of investment is a pre-condition. Only under consistent conditions, 
investments are allocated efficiently. If companies see any additional profit in 
climbing the ladder of investment, they will do so. Therefore, the ladder of 
investment shall also allow for possible migration processes from one rung 
of the ladder to the next 19.  
Conclusion: a consistent pricing structure with regard to the ladder of 
investment is a prerequisite. To incentivise operators to climb the 
ladder, prices have to be set so that higher profit margins are possible 
for investments higher up on the ladder of investment. It is also 
necessary to implement effective migration rules. 
With trend towards more competition law-based instead of sector-specific 
regulation, the consistent pricing within the ladder of investment may not be 
                     
19 On the aspect of static versus dynamic competition and the last mile problem involved see 
also BANERJEE & DIPPON, 2006 
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upheld as NRAs will remove access obligations for certain rungs of the 
ladder. Therefore the consistency within the pricing structure of the ladder 
may be distorted. This will automatically cause some distortions for those 
companies that are just starting to climb the ladder of investment. It has to 
be clearly stated that under competition law, prices may include additional 
cost components compared to pure cost oriented prices. Therefore, 
significantly higher access prices under competition law should not 
automatically mean that there is abuse in the pricing strategy as the 
underlying cost principles are different.  
Conclusion: the trend towards more competition law instead of sector-
specific regulation could distort the consistency of prices within the 
ladder of investment. This, in turn, may have a significant economic 
impact on the business models of alternative operators. 
Impact of new investments on new infrastructure (access holidays) 
An issue receiving increased interest lately is the topic of access holidays 
and (closely related) emerging markets: Following the idea of the new 
regulatory framework from 2002 (European Commission, 2002) whereby 
competition law shall gain a more prominent role and sector-specific 
regulation shall gradually be reduced, former monopolists as well as some 
new entrants have argued in favour of granting access holidays for these 
investments, especially when referring to new access possibilities like fibre 
to the home (FTTH) or UMTS. The basis for this argument is laid down in 
recital no. 15 of the recommendation on relevant product and service 
markets (European Commission, 2003, recital 15).  
The idea behind that argumentation is best described by Joseph 
Schumpeter (SCHUMPETER, 1918) where the interplay of invention as 
creative destruction and imitation leads to more competition. The aim is to 
foster innovation and to allow these companies to have some first mover 
advantages and therefore also a certain kind of (innovative) monopoly over a 
certain period of time.  
Technological innovation and the rollout of new networks are accelerating 
in Europe. The EU Commission's recommendation on relevant product and 
service markets has defined markets that are susceptible to ex ante 
regulation. With markets and technologies changing quickly, the question 
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arises whether and how to apply regulation to these markets 20. A more 
flexible approach than today's policy needs to be implemented in terms of 
the time and process for market definition, analysis etc. Otherwise, 
regulation will be too rigid to cope with the rapid technological changes of 
the future 21. Thus, the market is confronted with a steadily changing 
situation and NRAs are not empowered to consistently resolve new market 
problems.  
NRAs and the new framework will have to deal with the rigid idea of 
technological neutrality in the context of new markets. The market is already 
faced with inter and intra modal competition. This can be seen in the 
broadband market, where DSL operators, CATV-broadband operators and 
UMTS data card operators compete with each other. But it can also be seen 
in voice markets, where voice telephony is offered over traditional 
analogue/ISDN access lines, via indirect access or by mobile operators and 
VoIP services providers. In that area of potential conflict between traditional 
and new technologies NRAs will have to find a balance between regulation 
and the open market. 
The EU commission has initiated a discussion of a revision of the current 
and the potential introduction of a new regulatory framework to become 
effective by 2009-2010 22. It is clear that access holidays will reduce 
competitors' ability to offer products and services to consumers. This study 
shows that this will have negative effects on prices and penetration rates, if 
neither infrastructure nor service based competition is in place to be able to 
cut prices and drive penetration, and thus, innovation. This paper clearly 
shows that in order to maintain competition, service as well as infrastructure-
based competition needs to be in place to maximise consumers' benefits. 
Therefore, regulatory holidays for operators with significant market power 
who invest in emerging markets shall not be implemented. In order to 
financially consider the high risk of investment undertaken by operators with 
significant market power in new and innovative technologies, this is best 
                     
20 The German NRA recently launched a consultation on the concept of "new" markets, their 
definition and potential regulatory treatment: 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/enid/22bf816986c04634a7aed1b666c5315c,0/Regulierung_T
elekommunikation/Neue_Maerkte_2jg.html 
21 For an overview see:  
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/ index_en.htm  
and on emerging markets: 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/info_centre/public_consult/review/130
706reviewpresentation.pdf, pp. 17-27. 
22 http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/index_en.htm 
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achieved by allowing these companies an appropriate return on investment, 
which contains sufficient reward for the risks taken. Thereby, consumer 
interests are not harmed, the investing operator has enough incentives to 
invest and long-term competition can be enabled through access obligations. 
Conclusion: access holidays will reduce consumer benefits. In order to 
create incentives for operators with significant market power, NRAs 
must consider the the specific risks related to the investments in 
emerging markets in making their decisions. 
Summary 
With the European Information society "i2010" initiative (European 
Commission, SEC(2005) 717) Europe has started an ambitious project. A 
recent study has shown the positive impact of the European regulatory 
framework on the new member states, which joined EU on the May 1st 2004 
(HABERFEHLNER et al., 2006). The present study considers EU15 member 
states and shows that the integrated approach to the information society is 
partly "on track". We have seen the different modes of infrastructure and 
service-based competition strategies harmonize as a growing number of 
countries enable competition on all rungs of the ladder of investment and the 
different market players diversify their market strategies. With this, prices 
tend to harmonize and Europe is stepwise developing towards a single 
market, which can be seen in the leveraging effects of the different 
strategies on prices.  
As infrastructure-based competition leads to higher innovation and 
penetration rates, NRAs should foster inter and intramodal infrastructure-
based competition when applying the framework. With convergence and 
new technologies like broadband and VoIP emerging, access at the levels of 
networks, services, applications and devices and own infrastructure and thus 
ULL will become increasingly important for operators to be able to have the 
possibility to differentiate their products from those of competitors and to 
attract new customers.  
There are clear signs that infrastructure-based competition is more 
important to business customers and service-based competition is more 
important for residential customers. Therefore, if the majority of consumers 
are also to be able to benefit from competition then both liberalisation 
strategies will have to be in place – in a balanced approach.  
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The study has also shown that infrastructure-based competition does 
have an immediate (downward) effect on prices, which tend to remain stable 
afterwards. Under such circumstances, less tariff rebalancing will occur and 
alternative operators could refrain from investment in new infrastructure. On 
the other hand, service-based competition leads to significant tariff 
rebalancing in those parts of the value chain that are exposed to competition 
to a lesser extent. So these markets end up with higher access prices. In 
order to be competitive with infrastructure-based competition service-based 
competition needs much higher decreases in call prices to compensate for 
the increase in access costs.  
On the other hand, if infrastructure-based competition alone is 
introduced, the risk of collusion remains in the sense that competitors only 
compete in the access market while increasing prices for other services. 
Hence both regulatory strategies are required. These results are consistent 
with the theory that price competition will take place in those parts of the 
value chain that are exposed to competition. 
In most countries all rungs of the ladder of investment are now in place 
as regards the traditional network topologies. It seems that there is no pure 
and single way towards competition, but that markets need a healthy mixture 
of both, service-based and infrastructure-based competition. NRAs should 
consequently act in a stringent way regarding all rungs of the ladder in their 
pricing decisions. The market will react according to the strategic impact of 
the decisions made by NRAs, thus still relying on sector-specific regulation. 
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A 3,4% 17% 3,4% 65% 85% 45% 100% 2 ○ 
B 0,3% 21% 0,3% 49% 73% 3% 50% 1 --- (2) 
D 5,3% 9% 5,3% 13% 72% 38% 50% 2 ● 
DK 5,5% 12% 5,5% 36% 83% 52% 100% 2 ● 
E 1,7% 25% 1,7% 44% 65% 16% 75% (3) 0 ○ 
EL 0,1% 49% 0,1% 60% 53% 5% 0% 0 --- 
I 4,9% 15% 4,9% 30% 46% 46% 100% 1 ○ (4) 
IRL 0,1% 22% 0,1% 31% 35% 7% 100% 0 ○ 
F 7,0% 23% 7.0% 52% 61% 56% 50% 1 ● (5) 
L 1,2% 10% 1,2% 26% 59% 25% 100% 0 --- 
NL 8,1% 0% 8,1% 56% 100% 100% 100% 2 ● 
P 0,9% 8% 0,9% 21% 92% 36% 50% 0 --- 
S 5,5% 14% 5,5% 60% 82% 52% 100% 1 ● 
SF 8,2% 10% 8,7% 36% 79% 68% 50% 1 ● 
UK 0,3% 65% 0,3% 54% 39% 2% 50% 1 ○ (6) 
○ = Service based policy; ● = Infrastructure based policy; --- = Indecisive 
(1) The status is based on four categories of indirect access: carrier selection for local calls, 
carrier preselection for local calls, carrier selection for national calls, carrier preselection for 
national calls. Each category is weighted by 25%. 
(2) Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal were excluded as no allocation could be made. 
(3) Completion for local calls in November 2000. 
(4) The categorisation of Italy is due to the delay of the introduction of a standard offer for ULL 
and the early introduction of indirect access. In addition, the Italian NRA has focused on the 
introduction of a wholesale broadband product. (Source: OECD Report "Developments in Local 
Loop Unbundling", DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2002)5/FINAL, from September 10th 2003, pp. 22 and 45; 
ITU Regulatory Implications of Broadband Workshop - ITU New Initiatives Programme - May 2-
4th 2001 "Italian Case Study", April 26th 2001, p. 15) 
(5) The categorisation of France is due to the aim of the NRA to foster infrastructure competition, 
as well as the success of line sharing (Source: OECD Report "Developments in local loop 
unbundling", DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2002)5/FINAL, from September 10th 2003, pp. 39f; ERG 
"Broadband market competition report", ERG (05)23, May 25th 2005). 
(6) The results for the UK are very significant, which may seem astonishing as the UK has 
fostered infrastructure competition in earlier years, thereby referring to the fact that the UK 
market was opened up with the duopoly policy as early as the 1980s. These results are based 
on the situation in the new millennium, indicating that UK regulatory policy has evolved from 
infrastructure-based to service-based competition. 
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Annex 2 – T-test 
 
 
